Humphries v. Becker Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 41897 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-23-2014
Humphries v. Becker Respondent's Brief Dckt.
41897
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Humphries v. Becker Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41897" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5297.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5297
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 











EILEEN BECKER, ALLEN BECKER and ) 
JANE BECKER, ) 







SHEILA B. ADAMS, JERRY HINES, ) 
CENTURY 21 RIVERSIDE REALTY, ) 




) _____________ ) 
Supreme Court Case No. 41897 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Cassia County, District Judge 
.Jonathan Brody presiding. 
Attomevs for Appellants 
Richard J. Worst 
David W. Gadd 
Kirk A. Melton 
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Brooke Redmond 
Tyler Rands 
Wright Brothers Lmv Office, PLLC 
P.O. Box 226 
Twin Falls, ID 83303--0226 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROBERT HUMPHRIES and BECKY 
HUMPHRIES, 









EILEEN BECKER, ALLEN BECKER and ) 
JANE BECKER, ) 
Defendants - Respondents 
and 
SHEILA B. ADAMS, JERRY HINES, 
CENTURY 21 RIVERSIDE REALTY, 













) _______________ ) 
Supreme Court Case No. 41897 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Cassia County, District Judge 
Jonathan Brody presiding. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Richard J. Worst 
David W. Gadd 
Kirk A. Melton 
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Brooke Redmond 
Tyler Rands 
Wright Brothers Law Office, PLLC 
P.O. Box 226 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0226 
I. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 




Nature of the Case 
Course of Proceedings 






RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL P. 13 
Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to 
Respondents on all of Appellant's claims. 
Whether the District Court's grant of summary judgment can be affirmed 
on other grounds. 
Whether the District Court properly awarded costs and attorney's fees to 
the Beckers. 
Whether the Humphries' claim for attorney's fees on appeal is premature. 
Whether the Beckers are entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal 
pursuant to the parties' contract and Idaho law, including I.AR. 41, I.C. 
§ 12-120(1) and/or I.C. § 12-121. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
B. Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment 
to Respondents on all of Appellant's claims. 
1. The District Court properly granted summary judgment on 
the issue of fraud by misrepresentation. 










Beckers' alleged representations concerning the 
Wells were notfalse. 
The Beckers believed the representations 
concerning the Wells to be true. 
There was no evidence in the record creating a 
genuine issue of materialfc1ct that the automation 
<~f the sprinklers was material. 
The District Court properly granted summary 
judgment on the issue of fraud by nondisclosure. 
The District Court properly granted summary 
judgment on the issue of the Idaho Property Condition 
Disclosure Act. 
C. Whether the District Court's grant of summary judgment can be 







The Beckers are not liable for the representations of the 
Seller's Agent on the MLS Listing. 
The Beckers believed the representations concerning the 
sprinkler system to be true. 
The Beckers never represented to the Humphries that the 
Domestic Well would provide all irrigation and domestic 
water to the Property. 
The Humphries did not rely, or had no right to rely, on the 
Beckers' alleged representations. 
The Humphries have not raised a genuine issue of material 
fact as to damages. 
Allen and Jane are not liable for Eileen's representations. 













fees to the Beckers. P. 40 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2 -
E. Whether the Humphries' claim for attorney's fees on appeal is 
premature. 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
CONCLUSION 
II. 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 307 P.3d 176 (2013) 
Andersen v. Prof! Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 118 P.3d 75 (2005) 
Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799,241 P.3d 972 (2010) 
Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,292 P.3d 2481 (2012) 
Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 
272 P.3d 1263 (2012) 
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006) 
Crowley v. Critc!Jfield, 145 Idaho 509, 181 P.3d 435 (2007) 
Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 












Farm Credit of Spokane v. WW Farms, Inc., 122 Idaho 565, 836 P.2d 511 (1992)P. 41 
Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) P. 13-14 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991) P. 15 
Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58,294 P.3d 184 (2013) 
lntermountain Const., Inc. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 931, 
841 P.2d 1082 (1992) 
James v. Mercea, 152 ldaho 914,277 P.3d 361 (2012) 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380 (2005) 
KeybankNat'l Ass'n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 ldaho 287,311 P.3d 299 (2013) 
Lockheed Martin C01p. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 
134 P .3d 641 (2006) 
Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149,280 P.3d 176 (2012) 








Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354,218 P.2d 345 (1950) 
Printcrafi Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 
283 P.3d 757 (2012) 
Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609,288 P.3d 826 (2012) 
Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338,421 P.2d 133 (1966) 
Silicon Int'! Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538,314 P.3d 593 (2013) 
Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2,128 ldaho 714,918 P.2d 583 (1996) 
Sowards v. Rathburn, l 34 Idaho 702, 8 P .3d 1245 (2000) 
Steel Farms Inc v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 ldaho 259,297 P.2d 222 (2012) 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998) 
Walston v. Monumental L?fe Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 923 P.2d 456 (1996) 
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,681 P.2d 1010 (Ct. App. 1984) 
Cox v. City o_fSandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 90 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2003) 
Maxson v. Farmers Ins. of Idaho, Inc., l 07 Idaho 1043, 




LC. § 12-121 
LC.§ 42-111(1) 
I.C. § 55-2501 
I.C. § 55-2506 
I.C. § 55-2511(1) 
I.R. C.P. 54( d)(l) 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4 -
P. 19, 36 
P.25 






















STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of the purchase and sale of approximately one acre of residential real 
property outside of Burley, Idaho (the "Property"). The Property was sold by Eileen Becker 
("Eileen") to Robert and Becky Humphries (respectively, "Robert" and "Becky," and 
collectively, the "Humphries"). Humphries brought this lawsuit against Eileen, Eileen's son and 
daughter-in-law, Allen and Jane Becker (respectively, "Allen" and "Jane" and together with 
Eileen, the "Beckers"), Eileen's real estate agents, Sheila Adams ("Adams"), Jerry Hines 
("Hines") and Century 21 Riverside Realty ("Century 21" and together with Adams and Hines, 
the "Seller's Agent"), and the Humphries' own real estate agent, Marvis Brice ("Brice") and 
Advantage 1 Realty, LLC ("Advantage 1" and together with Brice, the "Buyer's Agent"), 
alleging fraud, misrepresentation, fraud by nondisclosure and breach of the Idaho Property 
Condition Disclosure Act found at LC. § 55-2501, et. seq. (the "Disclosure Act"), among other 
claims that are not pertinent to this appeal. Only the claims against the Beckers are at issue on 
this appeal. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Humphries filed a Complaint on July 5, 2011 alleging (1) that Eileen fraudulently 
represented that the Property would be provided irrigation water from a shared domestic purpose 
well (the "Domestic Well") with a neighboring property (the "Neighboring Property"); (2) that 
Eileen fraudulently represented that the Domestic Well was the only source of water to the 
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Property; and (3) that Eileen fraudulently represented on the Seller's Property Condition 
Disclosure Form (the "Disclosure Form") that the irrigation water for the Property was provided 
by a "private system."1 
On June 13, 2012, the Humphries filed their First Amended Complaint adding Allen and 
Jane as additional Defendants and alleging that (1) Eileen, Allen and/or Jane fraudulently 
represented that the Property would be provided irrigation water from the Domestic Well on the 
Neighboring Property; (2) that Eileen, individually, or through Allen and Jane as her agents, 
fraudulently represented that the Domestic Well was the only source of water to the Property; (3) 
that Eileen, Allen and/or Jane fraudulently represented on the Disclosure Form that the irrigation 
water for the Property was provided by a "private system;" ( 4) that Eileen, Allen and/ or Jane 
fraudulently represented that the sprinkler system for the Property was fully automatic; and (5) 
that punitive damages should be awarded against Eileen, Allen and/or Jane.2 
On June 27, 2012, the Beckers filed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the 
"Becker SJ Motion").3 In lieu of a response to the Becker SJ Motion, the Humphries sought 
more time to conduct additional discovery and requested leave to file a second amended 
complaint.4 Both requests were granted. 5 On August 15, 2012, and apparently, in response to 
the Becker SJ Motion, Humphries filed a Second Amended Complaint, withdrawing their claim 
1 R. at 12-15. 
2 R. at 112-19. 
3 R. at 135, 138, 172, 274. 
4 R. at 4, 282-326. 
5 R. at 5. 
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for rescission and adding allegations that Allen and Jane knowingly made fraudulent 
representations to them, and adding for nondisclosure and violations of the Disclosure Act. 6 
Thereafter, the Beckers renewed their Motion for Summary Judgment. 7 Following a 
hearing, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants' (Eileen, 
Allen, and Jane Becker) Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Memorandum Decision") on 
December 13, 2012, granting the Becker SJ Motion. 8 Humphries then filed a Motion to 
Reconsideration, which was denied (in parts pertinent to this appeal) by the Court on February 
9 19, 2013. 
On or about January 13, 2014, Humphries resolved its claims with the remaining 
defendants (the Seller's Agent) and an Amended Judgment was entered. 10 The Beckers then filed 
a timely claim for costs and attorney's fees, which was granted. 11 This appeal followed. 
C. Restatement of Facts 
For many years, up to 2008, Eileen lived in a home located at the Neighboring Property 
and Allen and Jane occupied the Property. 12 In or about mid to late 2008, Eileen decided to enter 
an assisted living facility, due to her decreased ability to take care of herself on her own. 13 The 
Beckers decided to exchange properties and sell the Property, because Allen and Jane wanted to 
6 R. at 335, 338, 340-42. 
7 R. at 370,425. 
8 R. at 6; MD. at 12. 
9 R. at 6, 646-673, 693-703. 
10 R. at 8, 736. 
11 R. at 8-9, 746-753, 758-759. 
12 R. at 263-64. 
13 R. at 264 
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live on the Neighboring Property. 14 The exchange was accomplished and Eileen then owned the 
Property outright. 15 However, she never actually lived there and knew very little, if anything, 
about the Property. 16 
The Property gets domestic water from the Domestic Well and its inigation water from 
an underground line that ties into a farmer's inigation system across the way from the Property 
(the "Irrigation Well" and together with the Domestic Well, the "Wells"). 17 The Property had 
seven automatic sprinkler heads. 18 While he was living on the Property, Allen disconnected two 
of the sprinkler heads, because he prefened to water longer than the maximum times allowed by 
the computer. 19 It would cost approximately one hundred to one thousand dollars to complete 
the wiring necessary to reconnect these two heads to the computer.20 Eileen did not know that 
Allen had disconnected the two sprinkler heads from the computer.21 
In the fall of 2008, the Beckers met with Adams to list the Property for sale.22 At that 
time, the Beckers fully explained the condition of the property to Adams, including the 
conditions now complained of by the Humphries concerning the status of the lawn sprinklers and 
the source of the inigation and domestic water supply.23 While meeting with Adams, Eileen 
14 R. at 264. 
15 R. at 264. 
16 R. at 269. 
17 R. at 265. 
18 R. at 266. 
19 R. at 266. 
20 R. at 273, 646-48. 
21 R. at 257. 
22 R. at 267. 
23 R. at 267-69. 
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personally signed the Disclosure Fonn.24 Allen and Jane helped Eileen understand the 
Disclosure F om1' s questions, the condition of the Property, and assisted her in completing the 
Disclosure Form.25 On the Disclosure Form, Eileen checked the required boxes for both 
domestic and irrigation water source indicating "Private System" for both.26 The Disclosure 
Form also provides that Eileen never lived on the Property. 27 
Shortly thereafter, Adams prepared an MLS listing statement (the "MLS Listing").28 
Adams never provided the Beckers with a copy of the MLS Listing and the Beckers were 
unaware of its contents until discovery disclosures were made during the course of these 
proceedings.29 In the "Features" category, under the "Water" heading, the MLS Listing provides 
"Shared Well."30 Under that same category, under the "Lawn Sprinklers" category, the MLS 
Listing provides "Auto; Full."31 Under the "Financial" heading, under "Agent Only Remarks," 
the MLS Listing provides, in pertinent part, "Well shared with [Neighboring Property] to the 
south on agreement being drawn."32 Shortly after meeting with Adams, Allen and Jane left for 
Yuma, Arizona and never saw the MLS Listing.33 
Humphries agreed to purchase the Property for approximately $160,000.00 and the 
parties entered into an RE-21 Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 15, 2009 
24 R. at 177-80. 
25 R. at 267-69. 
26 R. at 178. 
27 R. at 179. 
28 R. at 182-83, 380-81. 
29 R. at 267-69, 381, 391. 
30 R. at 182-83. 
31 R. at 182-83. 
32 R. at 182-83. 
33 R. at 269. 
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(the ''Real Estate Contract"). 34 Prior to closing, the Humphries never spoke to the Seller's Agent 
or the Beckers directly. 35 The Seller's Agent contacted Allen a couple of times to let him know 
the details of offers for the Property. 36 However, the Seller's Agent primarily communicated 
with and worked through Eileen.37 At no point were either Allen or Jane authorized to act on 
behalf of Eileen or to make any representations on behalf of Eileen. 38 Neither Allen nor Jane 
ever made any representations to the Humphries as agents of Eileen.39 
At closing, the Humphries were provided with and executed a Joint Well Use Agreement 
(the "Well Agreement"). 40 The Well Agreement provided that the Domestic Well would provide 
water to the Property for domestic purposes only.41 The Humphries acknowledge that they relied 
"heavily" upon the expertise and explanations of Buyer's Agent as to the use and capacity of the 
Domestic Well.42 Before they purchased the Property, Becky testified that they.were told the 
following by the Buyer's Agent: 
A: .... [The Buyer's Agent] basically went through the list and showed us 
things. And she did explain, when we looked at the house, that it was a shared 
well, and that we would share with the gentleman down the street, down the 
highway. And then she began to explain what a shared well was. It was one 
well, and that the well was a big well so it was ample to supply two homes. 
Because we didn't know what a shared well was at the time. 
Q: So you were relying on what [the Buyer's Agent] told you what a 
shared well was? 
34 R. at 415-24. 
35 R. at 235,235,241,250. 
36 R. at 271-72. 
37 R. at 400-01. 
38 R. at 394-95, 406. 
39 R. at 275. 
40 R. at 185-89, 231. 
41 R. at 185-86. 
42 R. at 250-51. 
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A: Yes.43 
The Buyer's Agent further advised the Humphries as to the contents of the Well 
Agreement, relating to them that it was "a very fair price, $20 a month for water for [the 
Humphries'] property."44 Specifically, concerning the suitability of the Domestic Well to meet 
their water needs, Becky testified: 
We read over [the Well Agreement]. And [the Buyer's Agent] told us that this is 
a basic well agreement, that it was a good well agreement, it was very fair for use 
of water on our property. She mentioned that - she mentioned a couple times that 
it was a good price for our home and our garden and our yard. And so we 
took her advice on that and didn't ask anv questions. We relied heavily on 
her, because we are not - we've never done a well agreement, and this was our 
first home. 45 
At closing, the Humphries signed a Hold Harmless Septic, Well & Water Agreement from their 
lender (the "Well Waiver").46 The Well Waiver provided that the Humphries were satisfied with 
the conditions of the well on the property and waived the need for an inspection.47 
In the Spring of 2009, the Humphries claim they first discovered that their irrigation 
water would not be supplied by the Domestic Well, but rather from the Irrigation Well.48 The 
Humphries claim they were "led to believe[] that everything was on one well," but admit that it 
was actually the Buver's Agent who advised them that the Well Agreement, and the Domestic 
Well, "covers all of [the Property]. to include [the Humphries'] garden that [the Humphries] 
43 R. at 250-51 ( emphasis added). 
44 R. at 231. 
45 R. at 249 (emphasis added). 
46 R. at 408. 
47 R. at 408. 
48 R. at 249. 
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wanted to do and our animals, if we get them."49 The Humphries admit that their interpretation 
of the alleged misrepresentations and condition of the Property came from the "explanation of 
[their] real estate agent. ,,so 
The Humphries admit that their domestic water comes from a shared well, and when 
asked whether he believed his inigation water came from a shared well, Robert responded: 
"That's - that's up for interpretation. It's coming from a shared well that I don't have any rights 
to and I'm not paying any money to."51 As for the issue of domestic and irrigation water coming 
from a "private system," Robert admitted as much at his deposition during the following 
exchange: 
Q: Is the domestic water for this house provided by a private system? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. And is the irrigation water provided by a private system? 
A: It's my understanding that inigation water is provided by a private system 
which I share and pay for, yes. But that's - that's my understanding of that, those 
two lines. What [the Beckers] understood it to mean, I have no idea. 52 
Accordingly, the parties are in agreement that the domestic water comes from a shared well on a 
private system and the inigation water comes from a shared well on a private system. The 
Humphries allege, however, that the Beckers should have disclosed more information to make it 
clear that there were two systems ( even though the forms never called for more information). As 
far as the Humphries' damages, at least from the date of purchase through the date of their 
49 R. at 234, 240. 
50 R. at 240. 
51 R. at 236. 
52 R. at 238. 
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depositions in this matter, the Humphries have enjoyed the use of the irrigation water from the 
Irrigation Well uninterrupted during irrigation season, while the irrigation system is active. 53 
IV. 
RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Respondents on all of 
Appellant's claims. 
Whether the District Court's grant of summary judgment can be affirmed on other grounds. 
Whether the District Court properly awarded costs and attorney's fees to the Beckers. 
Whether the Humphries' claim for attorney's fees on appeal is premature. 
Whether the Beckers are entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to the parties' 
contract and Idaho law, including I.AR. 41, I.C. § 12-120(1) and/or I.C. § 12-121. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews an order for summary judgment de novo and employs the same 
standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. AED, 
Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159,163,307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. 
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1996). Disputed 
facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can 
53R. at 233. 
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be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Fuller v. Callister, 
150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011). 
The nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation and a scintilla of evidence or only 
a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Bollinger v. 
Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632,637,272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012). The 
response of the adverse party, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(c); AED, Inc., 155 
Idaho at 163,307 P.3d at 180. Therefore, "the nonmoving party must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 
Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). "The moving party is entitled to judgment when the 
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case" on which it bears the burden of proof at trial. Silicon Int'! Ore, 
LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 544, 314 P.3d 593, 599 (2013). Where "the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this 
Court exercises free review." Lockheed Martin C01p. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 
790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). 
B. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Respondents on 
all of Appellant's claims. 
The Humphries allege that the Beckers made fraudulent misrepresentations as to (i) the 
source of the irrigation water; and (ii) the full automation of the sprinkler system. Additionally, 
the Humphries allege that the Beckers committed fraud by nondisclosure relative to the irrigation 
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well and the sprinkler system. Lastly, the Humphries alleged that Eileen breached the Disclosure 
Act. The District Court granted summary on each of the Humphries' claims based on a lack of 
evidence on the record sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
1. The District Court property granted summary judgment on the issue of fraud by 
misrepresentation. 
Fraud is composed of nine separate elements: "(1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) 
its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent to induce 
reliance; ( 6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) 
the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent and proximate injury." Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. 
May, 143 Idaho 595, 600, 150 P.3d 288,293 (2006). In order to find that summary judgment 
was improperly granted by the District Court, the appellant must show that sufficient evidence 
was presented to the District Court "to create a material issue of fact as to each element." 
Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609,615,288 P.3d 826, 832 (2012) (emphasis added). 
Failure to support one of the nine elements of a fraud claim will result in a dismissal of the entire 
claim. Id. Fraud and intentional misrepresentation are used interchangeably to describe the 
same actionable conduct. See G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,518 808 
P.2d 851, 855 (1991). 
With regards to the claims of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the Wells, the District 
Court granted summary judgment to the Beckers on two distinct grounds: that the representations 
concerning the Wells were not false; and that the Beckers believed the representations 
concerning the Wells to be true. 
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In order for this Court to reverse these findings, the Humphries must successfully 
challenge each of these grounds to prevail on appeal. AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC 155 
Idaho 159,164,307 P.3d 176, 181 (2013). Even ifthe appellant shows that the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment on some of the grounds, the judgment must be affirmed on 
the grounds not properly appealed. Id citing Andersen v. Prr~f'l Escrcrw Servs .. Inc., 141 Idaho 
743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) ("[T]he fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no 
consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other 
grounds."). Thus, if an appellant fails to contest all of the grounds upon which a district court 
based its grant of summary judgment, the judgment must be affirmed. AED, Inc., 155 Idaho at 
164,307 P.3d at 181. In addition, the Humphries cannot now present argumentation on this 
issue as this Court "will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply 
brief." Suitss v. Nix, 141 Idaho 705, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
The District Court identified two potential sources of alleged misrepresentations as to the 
source of the irrigation water. The District Court found as follows: 
There are two representations prior to closing that might be attributed to 
the Beckers concerning the source of the irrigation water. The first appears on the 
property condition disclosure form. The form contains areas for a seller of a 
property to indicate the source of domestic water as well as the source of 
irrigation water. There are only four options on the form for the seller to indicate 
the source of the water. The Beckers placed check.marks in boxes under the 
heading "private system", indicating that domestic water was provided by a 
private system, and that irrigation water was provided by a private system .... 
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The Humphries also argue that the Beckers are responsible for the MLS 
listing completed by Sheila Adams which indicates that a "shared well" is the 
-4 
source of water for the property .... ) 
With regard to the automation of the sprinkler system, the District Court found that "[t]he MLS 
listing states that the lawn sprinklers are 'full' and 'auto', indicating that the sprinklers are fully 
automatic" and that "the property disclosure form said the sprinklers were 'working' ."55 These 
findings are supported by the undisputed facts on the record. There are no other possible 
representations made by the Beckers to the Humphries. Ifthere are any other alleged 
misrepresentations, the Humphries have failed to identify them. "[T]he trial court is not required 
to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the 
party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court's attention." 
Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609,616, 288 P.3d 826, 833 (2012). 
a. The Beckers' alleged representations concerning the Wells were not false. 
As to the truth or falsity of the Beckers' representations, the District Court held as 
follows: 
The irrigation water was provided by the farm well, which was private. It could 
also be provided by the domestic well. There is no evidence that the source of 
the irrigation water is anvthing but a private svstem. 56 
Additionally, as to the "shared well" representation, the District Court held that"[ o ]nee again, 
this representation is not false. The source of water for the property is a shared well." 57 Simply, 
the Humphries failed to present any evidence on the record to create a genuine issue of material 
54 MD. at 7-8. 
55 MD. at 3; R. at 699. 
56 MD. at 7 (emphasis added). 
57 MD. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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fact that these statements were false. They have, and will surely continue to, argue that the 
statements were false. But, there is no evidence in the record to support their arguments, at least 
not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Humphries admit that their domestic water comes from a shared well, that the 
domestic water is provided by a private system and that the irrigation water is provided by a 
private system. 58 This testimony from the Humphries themselves is ample evidence in support 
of the truthfulness of these statements. The Humphries argue that the statements are not 
complete because there could be multiple interpretations and the Beckers should have disclosed 
more. This argument implicates the duty to disclose, discussed further below, but in no way 
establishes that the representations were false. The District Court held that the undisputed 
evidence of record showed that the representations were true. The domestic water is provided by 
a private system. The irrigation water is provided by a private system. The irrigation water is 
provided by a shared well. Accordingly, summary judgment on the issue of any 
misrepresentation concerning the source of the irrigation water was appropriate as there did not 
exist any genuine issues of material fact as to the truthfulness of the Beckers' representations. 
b. The Beckers believed their representations concerning the Wells were true. 
In addition to finding that the representations concerning the Wells were true, the District 
Court also went a step further and found that the Beckers believed these representations were 
true. Specifically, the District Court held as follows: 
58 R. at 236, 238. 
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The Beckers placed checkmarks in boxes under the heading "private system," 
indicating that domestic water was provided by a private system, and that 
irrigation water was provided by a private system. The evidence in the record 
indicates that the Beckers believed that this was true, and that both domestic 
and inigation water were provided by a private system. . . . Allen Becker 
believed the domestic well could be connected to the sprinkler system, and that it 
could provide enough water for the system, even if the water pressure would not 
be ideal. Therefore, this representation was not made with the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity, nor was the representation false. 59 
The District Court's holdings are supported by the tmdisputed factual evidence in the record. 
More importantly, the Humphries have failed to address this element of misrepresentation 
in their opening brief on appeal. Given this failure, this Court should affirm summary judgment 
on this issue as a matter of procedural course without the necessity of discussing the merits. See 
AED, Inc., 155 Idaho at 164, 307 P.3d at 181 (holding that if an appellant fails to contest all of 
the grounds upon which a district court based its grant of summary judgment, the judgment must 
be affirmed). As this was an independent basis for the District Court's decision to grant the 
Beckers summary judgment, summary judgment must be affirmed. 
Nonetheless, the District Court's holding on this issue is supported by the undisputed 
evidence. If the Beckers believed the alleged representation was true, they cannot be liable for 
fraud. This Court has held that "[f]raud will not be presumed," Nelson v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354, 
358,218 P.2d 345,348 (1950). The Plaintiff must prove all the elements, including that the 
speaker knew that he or she was committing fraud. There must be some sort of intent to deceive 
by the speaker. There is no negligent misrepresentation in Idaho, except in extremely narrow 
circumstances. See lntermountain Const., Inc. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 931,933,841 P.2d 
59 MD. at 7, citing R. 266,492 (emphasis added). 
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1082, 1084 (1992). However, the Humphries have failed to present any evidence on the record 
that the Beckers had any intent to deceive the Humphries or knew their representations were 
false. The Humphries essentially allege that the Beckers should have known their 
representations were false or misleading (assuming they were found to be false or misleading). 
That is a lesser standard of negligence, not fraud. In a similar analysis, this Court recently 
rejected such an interpretation imputing culpability to a speaker in fraud action based on what 
the speaker "knew or should have known" because it would improperly transform a fraud action 
into one for negligence. See James v. Mercea, 152 Idaho 914,920,277 P.3d 361, 367 (2012). 
As to the evidence in the record concerning the Beckers' knowledge of the truth or falsity 
of their statements, Allen testified as follows: 
Q: In your opinion, is the domestic water on a private system? 
A: Yes, it is. 
Q: In your opinion, is the irrigation water on a private system? 
A ·. y 1't. 60 es, 1s. 
Allen also testified as follows: 
Q: .... [C]an you show me anywhere on [the Disclosure Form] where it 
would state that there are two separate systems for water? 
A: Probably because they're checked in two different - checked in the - each 
column has its own check. And they got a domestic and irrigation. But it doesn't 
- no, it's just up to the interpretation, I would assume. 
Q: Do you think it's a reasonable interpretation to assume that when its 
speaking of a private system that they mean the same system? 
A: I would think they'd be checked together if it was the same system. It 
wouldn't be a different line for each. 
Q: And so if you were reviewing this document, not knowing what you know 
about the property, would you believe there was one source of water or two 
sources of water? 
60 R. at 530. 
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A: I would think there's two because there's two different marks, two 
different lines. It's on a different question. 
Q: Okay. Any other reason that you would think that? 
A: -- because I lived there and because all my neighbors do the same thing. 
Nobody pumps from 600 feet to water their lawn. Everybody runs off the 
farmers, you know. But out of everybody - out of 20 houses there, all of them 
run off the farm or off the farm water. ... 61 
The Beckers had no reason to believe this was a problem with the Property. This is how 
property is bought and sold in their area. The undisputed evidence supports that the Beckers 
believed that the Property's domestic water came from a shared well on a private system and the 
Property's irrigation water came from a shared well on a private system. 
Based on the fact that the representations were true, the Beckers believed the 
representations to be true and the Humphries failed to even make argument as to the Beckers' 
belief of the veracity of such statements, summary judgment should be affirmed. 
c. There was no evidence in the record creating a genuine issue of material fact that 
the automation o[the sprinklers was material. 
"Materiality refers to the importance of the misrepresentation in determining the 
plaintiffs course of action." Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,619,962 P.2d 387,390 (1998). The 
test for materiality can be either objective or subjective. Id. at 620, 962 P.2d at 390. In Watts, 
this Court noted: 
[A] representation is "material" if: 
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or 
61 R. at 270. 
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(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient 
regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of 
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it. 
Id. The Humphries contend that the District Cour1 erred by granting summary judgment as to 
representations regarding the automation of the sprinkler system because any finding of 
materiality is necessarily a question of fact. However, all of the elements of fraud are questions 
of fact. The issue presented to the District Court for determination on the Becker SJ Motion was 
whether there exist any facts on the record sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the automation of the sprinkler system or the amount necessary to repair the sprinkler 
system was material to the transaction or to Humphries decision to purchase the Property. The 
District Court properly held that there was not. 
As to the materiality of the sprinklers, the District Court held: 
There is no evidence indicating that the Humphries placed considerable import 
on a fully automatic sprinkler system, or that the Beckers knew that the 
Humphries cared about a fully automatic sprinkler system. . . . [E]ven though the 
Humphries aver to the contrary, there are no facts on the record establishing a 
genuine issue of material fact to the contrary concerning the materiality of the 
representation that the sprinkler were fully automatic.62 
The only evidence on the record as to the cost of repairing the sprinklers was (1) Allen's 
testimony that he unhooked two sprinkler heads from the system in order to prolong his watering 
times and it would cost $100 to hook up the two heads; and (2) the Affidavit of Scott Ganoe 
(presented only upon the Humphries' Motion.for Reconsideration) which provided that, in his 
62 MD. at 11 (emphasis added). 
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opinion, it would cost $1,000 to rewire five sprinkler heads to the computer system. 63 In light of 
this, the District Court held: 
This certainly gives rise to a disputed issue of fact [ as to the cost ofrepair], but 
the issue of whether the cost of converting the system was material to the 
underlying $160,000 transaction remains. As before, the Court finds that a 
reasonable man would not attach importance to this fact, and there is no evidence 
on the record to show that Becker knew that Humphries was 'likely to regard the 
· ,,64 matter as important. 
Robert also filed an affidavit simply stating that the issue of the automation of the sprinklers was 
material to the Humphries. On this evidence, the District Court found it: 
unpersuasive because it amounts to a bare denial of arguments made by Becker 
in their Motion for Summary Judgment, and is not supported by specific facts in 
the record. A genuine issue of fact does not arise from bare allegations or 
denials .... 
Beyond this bare denial there is little to no evidence in the record to 
suggest that a fullv automatic sprinkler svstem mattered to Humphries, and 
there is no evidence that Becker knew that mattered. It should also be noted 
that there is evidence that none of the Beckers had knowledge that the 
sprinkler system was not fully automatic (if it was not), which would also warrant 
summary judgment on this issue. There is not enough evidence in the record to 
indicate that any potential misrepresentation about the automation of the sprinkler 
systems made any difference in determining Humphries actions. 65 
Underlying the District Court's analysis of materiality is the complete absence of 
evidence on the record sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the issue was 
material to the Humphries or the transaction as a whole. The only evidence cited by the 
Humphries is Robert's own conclusory and self-serving affidavit. As held by the District Court, 
this kind of self-serving, conclusory affidavit does not create a genuine issue of material fact. On 
63 R. at 273, 646-48. 
64 R. 699-700. 
65 R. at 700, n. 3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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the other hand, the record contains evidence that it is not material to the Humphries. The 
purchase price of the Property was $160,000.00.66 After moving onto the Property, the 
Humphries made approximately $20,000.00 in improvements.67 If the Humphries were willing 
to pay $160,000.00 for the Property and then invest an additional $20,000.00 into the Property, it 
is simply beyond reason that an upgrade to the sprinkler system, whether it was $100.00 or 
$1,000.00, was material to the Humphries. 
In addition to the foregoing evidence on the record, the Humphries failed to raise a claim 
with regard to the sprinkler system until the First Amended Complaint filed nearly a year after 
the original Complaint and years after the discovery that the sprinklers were not fully automatic. 
Either they did not realize that a representation had been made-in which case they clearly did 
not rely on that representation; or, the sprinklers were not even a significant factor in filing suit 
in this matter (let alone in purchasing the Property)-in which case it clearly was not a material 
issue to them. 
The Humphries have failed to identify sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the materiality of the automation of the sprinklers to their decision to purchase 
the Property. Robert's self-serving and conclusory affidavit and the contention that it would cost 
one thousand dollars to automate five sprinkler heads is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact that the automation of the sprinklers, or the cost of the repair, were material to the 
overall transaction. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's award of 
summary judgment to the Beckers on this issue. 
66 R. at 415-24. 
67 R. at 173, 195-225. 
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2. The District Court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of fraud by 
nondisclosure 
The crux of the Humphries' arguments on appeal is whether the Beckers should have 
disclosed more to the Humphries in order to prevent any of their representations from being 
allegedly misleading. These allegations do not speak to fraudulent representations, but fraud by 
silence or nondisclosure. Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. Sowards 
v. Rathburn, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000). A party may be under a duty to 
disclose: (1) ifthere is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between the 
two parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial statement of the facts from being misleading; or (3) if 
a fact known by one party and not the other is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the 
contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does not 
know it. Id. Generally, a trial court's determination as to the existence of a duty is a matter of 
law. Printcrafr Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 452, 283 P.3d 757, 
769 (2012). This is true unless the Humphries can show that there are disputed facts bearing 
upon the existence of the duty. See Id. 
On this issue, the District Court found that the Beckers owed no fiduciary duty to the 
Humphries, and that there was no evidence that the Beckers knew that the Humphries did not 
know of the source of the irrigation water or that the system was not connected to the Domestic 
Well. 68 As to a partial statement of facts, the District Court held: 
Once it was disclosed to the Humphries that the source of water was for domestic 
purposes, it became irrelevant that the Beckers never told them about the 
68 MD. at 8; R. at 697 
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[Inigation Well]. This is because the [Well Agreement] limited the use of the 
domestic well to '·domestic purposes." . . . [ A ]ny duty the Beckers may have had 
to disclose more about the source of inigation water was satisfied by the [Well 
Agreement]. A proper understanding of the terms of the agreement would have 
led the Humphries to understand that they would not be able to irrigate the entire 
property with the domestic well. 69 
The District Court reiterated this holding following the Humphries' Motion.for Reconsideration, 
as follows: 
No duty to disclose that the sprinkler system was connected to the 
farm well rather than the shared well arose in this case. The only 
representations concerning the sprinkler system that could possibly be attributed 
to Becker were that it was working, that it was automatic, and that the inigation 
water was provided by a private system. Both parties were communicating solely 
through brokers who had years of experience from their broker. The [Disclosure 
Form] had separate places to indicate the source of the irrigation and domestic 
water. The [Well Agreement] indicated that the only well that Humphries were 
aware of ( or that they had a right to use) could be used only for domestic water. 
The farm well is still used to irrigate. Robert Humphries expressed concern that 
he might have to buy a gift certificate for the owner, and $100 per year was a lot 
of money. These facts, coupled with the only express representations that could 
be attributed to Becker, do not give rise to a duty to disclose. 
The Humphries were put on notice that there might be another source of 
water for the irrigation system. Becker made few representations about the 
sprinkler system that could be construed as a "partial statement of facts", 
and Becker disclosed that the only source of water Humphries were getting 
was for domestic purposes. There is no evidence Becker was aware of what 
Humphries knew about the source of water to the sprinkler system . ... 70 
In other words, the District Court found that to the extent the Beckers had a duty to disclose 
additional facts, such duty was satisfied once the Well Agreement was presented to the 
Humphries. Likewise, this also supports the holding the third scenario for non-disclosure did not 
69 MD. at 9. 
70 R. at 697-98 (emphasis added) (citations committed). 
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apply, because the Beckers had no way of knowing what the Humphries knew or, more 
importantly, what the Buyer's Agent advised them. 
The Well Agreement, which the Humphries acknowledged they reviewed with the 
Buyer's Agent and signed at closing, expressly provides that the use of the Domestic Well is 
limited to "domestic purposes."71 The Humphries had the truth of the matter staring them in the 
face at closing. The Humphries principal claim of fraud was that the Beckers allegedly 
misrepresented that the Domestic Well would provide both their domestic and irrigation water. 
The Well Agreement makes it abundantly clear that the Domestic Well would only provide their 
domestic water. These facts are undisputed. 
Humphries allege that they could not have known what "domestic purposes" meant. 
However, "domestic purposes" is a legal definition that has been clearly defined by Idaho law. 
Idaho Code§ 42-111(1) defines "domestic purposes" as follows: 
(a) The use of water for homes ... for any other purpose in connection therewith, 
including irrigation of up to one-half ( ½ ) acre ofland, if the total use is not in 
excess of thirteen thousand (13,000) gallons per day; or 
(b) Any other uses, if the total use does not exceed a diversion rate of four one-
hundredths (0.04) cubic feet per second and a diversion volume of twenty-five 
hundred (2,500) gallons per day. 
(Emphasis added). As the Property is one acre (larger than one-half acre), it was clear that the 
Domestic Well could not have provided for all of Humphries' water needs, something the 
Buyer's Agent should have advised Humphries on. The fact that the Buyer's Agent instead 
71 R. at 185-86. 
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instructed Humphries that the Domestic Well would provide all the water the Humphries needed 
is simply not the fault of the Beckers. 72 
On appeal, the Humphries also assert that "domestic purposes" is unclear because even 
the Seller's Agent was unable to explain what "domestic purposes" meant with certainty. 
However, a review of the Seller's Agent's actual testimony, cited by the Humphries in their 
opening brief, reveals the opposite. Hines testified as follows: 
Q: What was your understanding when this was being prepared of the 
meaning of [domestic water]? 
A: Domestic water, in my opinion, would include the household use and a 
small yard. I think the bureau of water resources refers to, when you get a well 
permit, that it's the house use and one-half acre.73 
Likewise, Adams testified as follows: 
Q: And I know you've answered this one, but could you remind me of what 
your definition of domestic use was? 
A: For the household and the - the immediate household area. 
Q: And does it also include irrigation, your understanding of domestic use? 
A: You can use it outside. 
Q: Is there a specific amount of -
A; There is. I don't know what that amount is. 
Q: If I told you it was a half acre, would that surprise you or would you 
disagree with that? 
A: It's - it's under an acre, I would agree to that. 
Q: And how big was the property at issue here? 
A: It is one acre. 74 
Contrary to the Humphries' assertion, there is no equivocation or uncertainty as to the meaning 
of "domestic purposes." Adams was not certain on the exact amount ofland a "domestic 
72 R. at 234,240,249. 
73 R. at 402-03. 
74 R. at 3 92-93. 
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purposes'' well could irrigate, but knew that it was less than one acre (which was the size of the 
Property). 
The undisputed facts show that the Humphries knew or should have known that the 
Domestic Well would only provide water for "domestic purposes" (up to ½ acre). According to 
Humphries, the Buyer's Agent told Humphries that all their water would come from the 
Domestic Well and that they would have all the water they needed from that well to accomplish 
all their desired objectives on the Property. 75 Humphries did not ask any questions and relied 
heavily on their agent's representations and explanations of "domestic purposes." The Beckers 
had no duty, under the circumstances, to say anything more than they did. Thus, the Humphries 
have failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of .circumstances 
giving rise to a duty to disclose in this case. Accordingly, the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Beckers on the issue of fraud by nondisclosure. 
3. The District Court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of the Idaho 
Property Condition Disclosure Act 
The Disclosure Act requires the seller of residential real property to disclose "the source 
of water supply to the property." LC.§ 55-2506 (emphasis added). The Second Amended 
Complaint alleges that Eileen "failed to disclose fully the source of water supply to the" 
Property.76 Idaho Code§ 55-2508 requires a seller to specify the type of well and septic system 
and any known problems. This is the only required disclosure relative to water. The Disclosure 
Form actually expands on the form required by the Disclosure Act to the source of irrigation and 
75 R. at 234, 240, 249. 
76 R. at 341-42 (emphasis added)/ 
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domestic water. The Humphries would expand upon the requirements of the Disclosure Act 
even further to include a narrative to detail the delivery system attendant to each type of water, 
and whether there are multiple systems to the Property or whether it is all on one system. This is 
not what the Disclosure Act requires. 
On this issue, the District Court held: 
Eileen completed a property condition form that covers more than is required by 
the IPCDA, and checked the boxes for 'private system' under the only portion of 
the form dedicated to the source of water. Furthermore, the [Well Agreement] 
and the MLS listing indicated that the source of water to the property was the 
domestic well, and that it was for domestic purposes. 77 
Following the Humphries' Motion.for Reconsideration, the District Court reiterated: 
[T]here is no violation of the IPCDA unless the transferor knows of a "problem" 
with the property, but fails to disclose a "problem" with the property in this 
section .... If the "problem" is now alleged to be that the right to use the farm 
well was not included in the sale of the property, there is nothing in the record 
indicating Eileen was even aware of this fact. A transferor is only liable under the 
IPCDA for information within the transferor's "personal knowledge."78 
The Humphries allege that Eileen must have violated the Disclosure Act because of what 
the Humphries did not know. However, the proper focus of the inquiry is: (1) what does the 
Disclosure Act require; and (2) what did Eileen know. The undisputed evidence establishes that 
Eileen filled out the Disclosure Form, which is the form that the Idaho Association of Realtors 
requires its realtors to use. 79 The Disclosure Form requires the seller to disclose the source of 
water for three types of water: domestic; irrigation; and sewer. There are five boxes available for 
the seller to check when determining the source of water: public system, community system, 
77 MD. at 12. 
78 R. at 701; citing James v. Mercea, 152 Idaho 914, 918, 277 P.3d 361, 365 (2012) 
79 R. at 389-90. 
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private system cistern and other. Those are the only options available to the seller. In this case, 
Eileen checked "private system" for all three sources of water. She believed the domestic water 
was provided by a private system and that the irrigation water was provided by a private system. 
The Disclosure Form called for a checkmark, so Eileen checked the box. Eileen cannot be liable 
for breach of the Disclosure Act if she believed her representation was true. See LC. § 55-
2511 (1) ( a seller is not liable for any error, inaccuracy or omission of any information if such 
error was not within the personal knowledge of the seller). 
The Humphries argue that the checked boxes did not make it clear that it was not all on 
one system. However, the Disclosure Act does not require this. It only requires that the source 
of water is disclosed, which it was. The Domestic Well and Irrigation Well are both, in fact, on 
private systems. Those facts are undisputed by evidence in the record. More importantly, the 
fact that the Disclosure Form has a separate section for domestic and irrigation water should 
have put the Humphries on notice that there may be two systems. This is especially true in light 
of the Well Agreement that made it abundantly clear that the Domestic Well was only for 
domestic uses. These two documents together should have put the Humphries on notice that 
there were potentially two sources of water. 
Finally, the fact that the Disclosure Form also requested a disclosure as to the sewer 
water (in the exact same section as the domestic and irrigation water) further supports the 
disclosures actually made. Eileen disclosed that the sewer water was on a private system, 
nothing more. She did not disclose that it was on a different private system from the domestic 
water or the irrigation water, but the Humphries could not seriously maintain that Eileen 
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breached the Disclosure Act or committed fraud by not disclosing that the sewer was on a 
different system than the domestic and irrigation water. The fact that the Humphries made 
unfounded assumptions based on the Disclosure Form does not equate to a violation of the 
Disclosure Act. Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on this 
issue in favor of Eileen. 
C. Whether the District Court's grant of summary judgment can be affirmed on other 
grounds. 
In summary judgment proceedings, an appellate court might affirm a decision of the 
lower court upon a theory different from that upon which the lower court relied. Bob Daniels & 
Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,540,681 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Ct. App. 1984). An appellate court 
independently may determine from the record whether a genuine issue exists as to a material fact 
on any alternate theory. See id.; Maxson v. Farmers Ins. of Idaho, Inc., 107 Idaho 1043, 1044, 
695 P.2d 428,429 (Ct. App. 1985). Where only one reasonable inference can be drawn from 
undisputed facts, the court may draw the inference even though it is adverse to the party against 
whom summary judgment is entered. Id. Thus, in the event this Court finds that the District 
Court erroneously granted summary judgment on the issues argued above, or, if this Court finds 
any one of the other remaining elements of fraud more suitable to summary judgment on issues 
presented below, it may affirm the District Court's award on this alternate theory. See Edged In 
Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 ldaho 176, 321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014) ("[T]he district 
court resolved this case on an alternative theory that this Court finds is not necessary to reach in 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 32 -
light of [another] undisputed fact."); Grazer v. Jones, 154 ldaho 58, 64,294 P.3d 184, 190 
(2013) (affirming a correct result reached on an erroneous theory). 
In addition to the grounds relied upon by the District Court in granting summary 
judgment to the Beckers, summary judgment is also appropriate on any one of numerous 
additional grounds raised by the Becker SJ Motion. Both before the District Court and again on 
appeal, the Humphries have failed to cite to evidence on the record sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to these issues. In the absence of any direct citation to relevant evidence 
on the record sufficient to create such a genuine issue, summary judgment is appropriate. "[T]he 
trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine 
issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that 
evidence to the court's attention." Quemada, 153 Idaho at 616,288 P.3d at 833. 
1. The Beckers are not liable for the representations of the Seller's Agent on the MLS 
Listing. 
A review of the MLS Listing reveals that the features section states "Shared Well" under 
the feature "water" and states "Well shared with Becker home to the south on agreement being 
drawn." Likewise, the MLS Listing also reveals that the features section states "Auto" and 
"Full" under the feature "lawn sprinklers." The Beckers cannot be held liable for the 
representations of the Seller's Agent contained on the MLS Listing and are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law as to these claims. 
Idaho Code § 54-2093(1) provides: 
A client, as defined in this chapter, whether buyer or seller, shall not be liable for 
a wrongful act, error, omission or misrepresentation of his broker or his 
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broker's licensees unless the client had actual knowledge of or reasonably should 
have known of the wrongful act, error, omission or misrepresentation. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Beckers never saw or reviewed the MLS Listing and were not aware of its contents 
until well after the sale had closed.80 In fact, at Eileen's deposition, Humphries' counsel had to 
explain to her what an MLS Listing was and what it said. 81 Likewise, Adams testified that she 
did not provide the Beckers a copy of the MLS Listing prior to listing it, and that it was not 
standard in the industry to do so.82 
Shortly after meeting with Adams, Allen and Jane went to Arizona and Eileen moved 
into a nursing facility. 83 There is no evidence on the record creating a genuine issue of material 
fact that the Beckers knew of the contents of the MLS Listing or should have known of its 
contents. For example, the Humphries have failed to identify any evidence that the Beckers even 
knew that the MLS Listing represented that the sprinklers were fully automatic. The Beckers 
certainly cannot be liable for "representations" they did not even know were made. As such, 
summary judgment on this issue is appropriate in favor of the Beckers as to any representations 
contained on the MLS Listing. 
2. The Beckers believed the representations concerning the sprinkler system to be true. 
There is no dispute that Eileen believed, up until the date of her deposition, that the 
sprinklers were fully automatic. She testified as follows: 
80 R. at 267-69, 381,391. 
81 R. at 257. 
82 R. at 391. 
83 R. at 269-69, 381,397. 







Are the sprinklers fully automatic at the [Property]? 
The sprinklers are automatic? 
That's my question. 
Well, you just push the switch and it turned them on and off. 
You don't have to go out and manually turn them on and off? 
84 No. 
(R. at 257). Allen and Jane also believed the sprinkler system to be fully automatic, except for 
the two sprinkler heads that were disconnected. 85 There is no genuine issue of material fact as to 
Becker's belief of the truthfulness of their representation concerning the sprinkler system. 
3. The Beckers never represented to the Humphries that the Domestic Well would 
provide all irrigation and domestic water to the Property. 
The MLS Listing and the Disclosure Form contain the only possible representations of 
the Beckers to the Humphries. The Humphries allege that the Beckers represented that the 
Domestic Well would be the source of all domestic and irrigation water. 86 However, no such 
representation was made to the Humphries at all. Nowhere in the MLS Listing or the Disclosure 
Form is there any representation that the Domestic Well would provide all of the irrigation and 
domestic water for the Property. Any misunderstanding the Humphries had relative to the 
adequacy of the Domestic Well to fulfill all of their water needs was created by the bad advice of 
the Buyer's Agent, upon which the Humphries "heavily" relied. 87 Now that the Humphries have 
learned that things are not as they assumed or were led to believe by their agent, they want to go 
back and impose liability on the Beckers-not just claiming that there was a misunderstanding, 
but that the Beckers affirmatively lied to them and that there was some malicious intent or 
84 R. at 257. 
85 R. at 273. 
86 R. at 337-40. 
87 R. at 240, 249. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 35 -
conspiracy to defraud them. However, there are simply no facts on the record supporting these 
assertions. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Beckers is appropriate on the issue 
of the source of the irrigation water. 
4. The Humphries did not rely, or had no right to rely, on the Beckers' alleged 
representations. 
With regards to the reliance element of fraud, this Court has held: 
A pmiy is not entitled to relief on the ground of false representations where he 
does not rely upon them but relies on his own judgment or investigations or his 
own examination of the propertv involved or on the advice of third persons. 
Nelson v. Ho.ff, 70 Idaho 354,360,218 P.2d 345, 349 (1950) (emphasis added). The undisputed 
evidence in the record establishes that the Humphries did not rely on the Beckers' 
representations, but upon representations of the Buver's Agent. To that end, the District Court 
observed as follows: 
It appears that the Humphires did not understand or investigate this [the "domestic 
purposes" language of the Well Agreement] because their real estate agent told 
them that the well would provide the water the Humphries would need. 88 
In other words, the District Court acknowledged that the Humphries' reliance was not on the 
Beckers' statements, but on the Buyer's Agent's statements. 
The Humphries' testimony supports this finding. Specifically, Becky testified as follows: 
We read over [the Well Agreement]. And [the Buyer's Agent] told us that this is 
a basic well agreement, that it was a good well agreement, it was very fair for use 
of water on our property. She mentioned that - she mentioned a couple times that 
it was a good price for our borne and our garden and our yard. And so we 
took her advice on that and didn't ask anv questions. We relied heavily on 
h 89 ..£!: .. . 
88 MD. at 9 (emphasis added). 
89 R. at 249 (emphasis added). 
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The Humphries further admit that it was the Buyer's Agent who advised them that the Well 
Agreement, and the Domestic Well, would provide "water to our home and our garden and all of 
that" and all that the Humphries wanted to do on the Property as well as their animals.90 
It is clear from this undisputed evidence that the Humphries relied on the representations of the 
Buyer's Agent, not the Beckers, when it came to the meaning of "shared well," the source and 
amount of domestic and irrigation water available to the Disputed Property and what the 
Humphries could do with that water. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that the Humphries relied upon the Buyer's 
Agent for their erroneous understanding of what they were reading and signing. There is no 
genuine issue of material fact that the Beckers fully disclosed that the Domestic Well would 
provide only domestic water to the Property, which is limited to one-half acre. The Humphries' 
own testimony provides that they did not ask questions because of the assurances of the Buver' s 
Agent. 91 Accordingly, summary judgment on the Humphries' claims regarding the source of the 
irrigation water is appropriate both on the elements of actual reliance and the right to rely. 
5. The Humphries have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to damages. 
The Humphries have not pled or raised any issue of the amount of damages sustained by 
the alleged misrepresentations of the Beckers. Idaho courts have demonstrated a commitment to 
the "out-of-pocket" rule in assessing fraud damages which "limits the recovery of damages to the 
90 R. at 240. 
91 R. at 240, 249. 
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difference between the real value of the property purchased and the price paid or contracted for." 
Walston v. Monumental L?fe Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 217, 923 P .2d 456, 462 ( 1996). However, 
that rule is not exclusive and other remedies can be fashioned for "[ e ]very wrong which is the 
natural and proximate result of the fraud." Id. quoting Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338,346,421 
P .2d 13 3, 141 (1966). This includes the "benefit-of-the-bargain" rule that measures damages as 
the "difference between the real value of the property purchased and the value which it would 
have had the representations been true." Id. 
Under either measure of damages, there have been no facts alleged regarding the real 
value of the property from which to begin an assessment of the damages actually suffered by the 
Humphries should the misrepresentations alleged against the Beckers be proven. In order to 
survive summary judgment, the plaintiff in a fraud case must present sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to each element that he is required to prove in order to 
establish his claim of fraud. See Quemada, 153 Idaho at 615, 288 P.3d at 832. The undisputed 
evidence on the record before the District Court established that the Humphries had enjoyed 
continuous and uninterrupted use of the Property and the Irrigation Well since they purchased the 
Property.92 They have not alleged or come forward with any evidence sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to damages. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is 
appropriate in favor of the Beckers. This would dismiss all claims the Humphries have brought 
against Becker. 
92 R. at 233. 
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6. Allen and Jane are not liable for the representations of Eileen. 
In the event that this Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist on the 
Humphries' claims, it should still affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment as to 
Allen and Jane. Aside from Allen acting as a middleman to relay messages to his mother, there 
is no evidence in the record that Allen or Jane acted as Eileen's agent in this matter or made any 
representations to the Humphries prior to closing. Adams and Hines each testified in their 
deposition that Eileen was their client.93 Moreover, they each acknowledged that they would not 
have accepted any documents signed by either Allen or Jane, because Eileen was the owner of 
the Property.94 The undisputed evidence establishes that neither Allen nor Jane ever spoke to 
Humphries or their agents prior to closing on the Property. Allen and Jane were present at the 
initial meeting with the Seller's Agent when Eileen signed the Disclosure Form. However, 
Eileen signed the Disclosure Form. As such, any representations on the Disclosure Form were 
made by Eileen, not Allen or Jane. Allen and Jane cannot be held liable for representations made 
by the "principal" herself. Beyond that, there is nothing indicating that Allen or Jane did 
anything else in a representative capacity or otherwise, to represent anything to the Humphries or 
induce them to act in any way. Accordingly, summary judgment is proper in favor of Allen and 
Jane on all of the Humphries' claims against them, even if this Court determines that their claims 
may proceed against Eileen. 
93 R. at 394-95. 
94 R. at 394-5. 
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D. Whether the District Court properly awarded costs and attorney's fees to the 
Beckers as the prevailing party. 
The District Court awarded the Beckers their costs and fees as the prevailing party below, 
pursuant to the Real Estate Contract and LC.§ 12-120(1). The Humphries allege that the 
District Court's award of the Beckers' costs and fees was improper. Their sole argument on 
appeal for the impropriety of the award of costs and fees is that summary judgment was 
inappropriate and, therefore, the Beckers were not the prevailing party. Accordingly, in the 
event that this Court affirms the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Beckers on 
any basis, it must also affirm the District Court's award of costs and fees, as no other issue has 
been raised on appeal concerning the propriety of the fee award. 
E. Regardless of the outcome, the Humphries are not entitled to attorney's fees on 
appeal until all claims are resolved at the trial level. 
The Humphries claim that, if successful on appeal, they are entitled to an award of costs 
and attorney's fees incurred on appeal pursuant to the Real Estate Contract and I.A.R. 40 and 41. 
However, an award of attorney's fees based on a prevailing party analysis is improper until the 
claims are fully resolved. Steel Farms Inc v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259,269,297 P.2d 
222, 232 (2012). "Since each claimin an action must be resolved before a court may determine 
the prevailing party, the identity of the prevailing party in this case will not be known until 
proceedings at the trial level are complete." Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l); Bagley v. Thomason, 
149 Idaho 799, 804-05, 241 P.3d 972, 977-78 (2010); Cox v. City o,fSandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 
133, 90 P.3d 352, 358 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[I]t remains to be seen whether Cox will be the 
prevailing party in the action, and, therefore, entitled to attorney fees."). Accordingly, even if 
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successful on appeal, an award of attorney's fees to Humphries is inappropriate unless and until 
they are determined to be the prevailing party at the trial court. 
VI. 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
The Beckers seek an award of its costs incurred in filing this appeal pursuant to the Real 
Estate Contract and Idaho law, including I.A.R. 40, and all reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
pursuing this appeal pursuant the Real Estate Contract and Idaho law, including I.A.R. 41, I.C. § 
12-120(1) and LC.§ 12-121. 
A. Purchase and Sale Agreement 
"Where there is a valid contract between the parties which contains a provision for an 
award of attorney fees and costs, the terms of that contractual provision establish a right to an 
award of attorney fees and costs." Farm Credit o_fSpokane v. WW Farms, Inc., 122 Idaho 565, 
836 P.2d 511 (1992) (emphasis added). Likewise, in Bolognese v. Forte, this Court held that 
attorney's fees on appeal could be awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to a purchase and sale 
agreement. 153 Idaho 857, 867, 292 P.3d 2481, 2491 (2012). 
Paragraph 27 of the Real Estate Contract provides as follows: 
If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceedings 
which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees, including such costs and fees on appeal. 
(R. at 419) ( emphasis added). 
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Humphries brought this action against the Beckers alleging misrepresentations 
concerning the sale of the property at issue in the Real Estate Contract (and claims pursuant to 
Disclosure Act, which was also at issue in Bolognese). Accordingly, upon finding that the 
Beckers are the prevailing party in these proceedings, the Beckers respectfully requests that the 
Court also award its costs and attorney's fees incun-ed on appeal. 
B. Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) 
The Beckers also seek attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1), which provides, that 
"in any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there 
shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party ... a reasonable amount to be fixed by the 
court as attorney's fees. For I.C. § 12-120(1) to apply, the pleading must specifically allege that 
the amount pleaded does not exceed $35,000. See Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 
149,156,280 P.3d 176, 183 (2012). Furthermore, "I.C. § 12-120 mandates an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Keybank Nat'! Ass'n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 
Idaho 287,297, 311 P.3d 299, 309 (2013). 
The Second Amended Complaint specifically caps damages, for each claim against the 
Beckers, at less than $35,000. (R. at 337, 341, 342, 343). Accordingly, given the mandatory 
language ofl.C. § 12-120(1), in the event that the Beckers are deemed the prevailing party on 
appeal, an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to this section is required. 
C. Idaho Code § 12-121 
The Beckers also seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. Attorney fees 
under I.C. § 12-121 are appropriate if an appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
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unreasonably, or without foundation. See Cro-wley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509,514, 181 P.3d 
435, 440 (2007). 
In this case, Humphries sued Eileen, a nearly eighty year old woman, for fraud based on 
one checked box ( checked only by Eileen, not Allen or Jane) and a written statement made by 
Becker's real estate agent that the Beckers never saw. Not only did they sue Eileen, but they 
sued her son and daughter in law, when it was clear that they made no representations to the 
Humphries. At various junctures, when the Humphries' claims were proving inadequate, they 
amended their complaint to add parties and claims (including punitive damages) and conducted 
even more discovery in attempts to dig up any favorable facts. After multiple rounds of 
discovery, depositions and tremendous expense, the Beckers were awarded summary judgment 
because the Humphries did not and cannot prove each required element of fraud, as a matter of 
law. Their claims are simply not supported by facts of record or applicable law. 
The Humphries then pursued this appeal of the District Court's decision, raising the same 
arguments they raised below and asking this Court to re-evaluate it all. Throughout the 
proceedings below, and now on appeal, they focus on the same two or three elements of fraud 
( despite the absence of reliable evidence on the record) and completely ignore every other 
element of fraud, each of which is fatal to their claims. Aside from the expense and negative 
effects of this lawsuit, the merits of which were questionable in the first place, the Humphries 
have continued in uninterrupted occupancy of the Property with no tangible damages shown on 
the record, or even alleged for that matter, suffered as a result of the Beckers' representations. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Beckers respectfully contend that the Humphries' efforts to 
bring this action against them, and the manner that it has been litigated and now appealed, were 
unreasonable, frivolous and without foundational support in law or fact. Accordingly, the 
Beckers request that the Court award its attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the District Court properly awarded summary judgment to 
the Beckers on all of the Humphries claims. As to the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation 
regarding the source of the irrigation water, the undisputed evidence on the record shows that (i) 
the statements made by the Beckers were true; and (ii) the Beckers believed their statements to 
be true. Alternatively, the Court should affirm the District Court's award of summary judgment 
solely on the Beckers' belief as to the truth of the representations, as the Humphries have failed 
to argue these independent grounds for summary judgment on appeal. 
As to the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the sprinkler system, the 
undisputed evidence on the record shows that the automation of the sprinkler system was not 
material in this transaction, either to the Humphries, personally, or to the transaction as a 
whole-even if the Court accepts the Humphries' evidence that it may cost $1,000 to fix. The 
Humphries have failed to otherwise produce any evidence on the record as to materiality 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 
As to the claim that the Beckers violated a duty of disclosure, the undisputed evidence on 
the record shows that such a duty never arose in this case and the District Court properly granted 
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judgment to the Beckers as a matter of law. The truth of the situation was fully disclosed by the 
Well Agreement. The Humphries' e1Toneous assumptions were created by the advice of the 
Buyer's Agent, not the Beckers or any of their representations. 
As to the claim that Eileen violated the Disclosure Act, the undisputed evidence shows 
that Eileen fully complied with all the requirements of the Disclosure Act, and more. She fully 
disclosed the source of water to the Property, as statutorily required. By checking a box that 
indicated the source of irrigation and domestic water, Eileen did not represent that there were 
two systems or assume a further duty under the Disclosure Act to explain every facet of the 
delivery systems attendant to each. 
As to each and every claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the Beckers also contend that 
this Court may independently review the record, as cited by the parties herein and below, and 
determine that there were no genuine issues of material fact on any number of the other elements 
of fraud required to be proven by the Humphries. The Becker SJ Motion laid out various 
arguments that were not relied upon by the District Court in issuing the Memorandum Decision 
and Memorandum on Reconsideration. All of these constitute independent grounds upon which 
this Court can affirm the District Court's award of summary judgment as a different theory 
reaching the same correct result. 
Regardless of the outcome of appeal, the Humphries are not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. The Beckers, however, are entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees in 
the event this Court affirms the District Court's award of summary judgment. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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DATED this 18th day of September, 2014. 
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By: l?anmk£ ~ 
Brooke B. Redmond 
Attorneys for Respondents Eileen Becker, Allen 
Becker and Jane Becker 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Richard J. Worst 
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P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
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